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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
WILLS AND ESTATES
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
In In re Edward's Estate' the former executors of the estate, after the
estate was dosed, sought a declaratory judgment. They asked that an heir at
law of the deceased who had, they alleged, not been served with nonce of the
application seeking probate of the will of the deceaied be held estopped from
making any claim objecting to the probate of the will of the administration
of the estate. From a final order of the probate court overruling the applica-
non of the executors, the executors appealed. The court of appeals held that
by virtue of the heir's conduct which indicated an intention to waive any
objection to probate or administration (he executed a waiver when the
matter was brought to his attention) and his complete knowledge of all
proceedings (he testified that to the best of his recollection he was in fact
served with nonce) and the absence of any claim of fraud, the heir is
estopped from asserting any adverse claim, and the probate court, having
equitable jurisdiction in the administration of estates and the power to en-
tertain a declaratory judgment action to determine the rights of persons in-
terested in such a proceeding, had the power to render such judgment.
The question of whether a probate court, after a finding that property
should be excluded from an inventory, has authority to direct the adminis-
trator to redeliver it to the owner was involved in Hoover v. Hoover.2 The
court of appeals held that the probate court possesses the authority to de-
termine whether inventoried property belongs to an exceptor to the in-
ventory. If the property is found to belong to him, the court has no au-
thority to direct its redelivery to the exceptor-owner either upon a motion
to vacate the approval of the original inventory or upon exceptions to the
amended inventory. While the decision appears to be a correct interpreta-
tion of the powers of the probate court the court's lack of authority in such
a situation seems undesirable.
Presentation of Creditors' Claims
It was held in In re Gogan's Estate' that the appellant who was con-
fined to a county jail was a "person in captivity" and therefore included
within Ohio General Code Section 10512-2 defining legal disability. Fur-
thermore, the probate court was held to have abused its discretion in dis-
missing the appellants petition for authority to file his claim as a creditor
with the administrator more than four months after his appointment. Al-
though the permissive word "may" is used in Section 10509-134, the dis-
' 106 N.E.2d 87 (Ohio App. 1951).
'90 Ohio App. 148, 104 N.E.2d 41 (1950)
8 108 N.E.2d 170 (Ohio App. 1951).
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missal of the appellanes petition by the probate court was an abuse of dis-
cretion because of the dear showing of legal disability on the appellanes
part, namely, confinement in the county jail for murder (a non-bailable
offense) during the four-month period for presentation of claims.
However, in view of the fact that the appellant while in the county
jail had executed and filed in the probate court a declination to act as execu-
tor and had renounced any claim to the estate, the position taken by the
dissenting judge seems preferable.
The question of whether an admintstratrix, appointed on the assump-
tion that she was the sole heir of the decedent and a creditor of the estate,
is required as a creditor to present her claim to the probate court and serve
notice thereof on herself as sole heir, pursuant to Ohio General Code Sec-
tions 10509-106 through 10509-108, was presented in Haag v. MAe-fley.4
Subsequent to the appointment under this assumption it was found that she
was not an heir, because not legally adopted, and she resigned. An ad-
ministrator d. b. n. was appointed and the court set a four-month period for
presentation of claim to hu. The plaintiff, the former administratrix,
presented her claim for the first time to the administrator d. b. n, within
-four months after his appointment. After the claim was rejected, the
plaintiff brought suit in common pleas court. The administrator d. b. n. de-
murred on the ground that the claim was not timely filed. The court sus-
tained the demurrer and dismissed the petition. On appeal it was held that
since the law does not require a claimant to do a vain act the mandatory pro-
visions of statutes are softened when their application would run contrary
to reason and common sense. The court reasoned that since the plaintiff
presented her claim within four months after the administrator d. b. n. was
appointed as required by the probate court order her presentation was timely
and the demurrer was improperly, sustained.
In In re Fahle's Estate5 the court held that in the absence of evidence
that a creditor of a decedent had read a notice of the death or the appoint-
ment of an administrator of the decedent, proof of publication of such
notice was insufficient to establish "actual notice" thereof as the phrase is
used in Ohio General Code Section 10509-134. This section prescribes the
conditions under which a claimant who has failed to present his claim with-
in four months may have the right to file after such period has expired, one
of which is that the claimant did not have actual notice of the decedents
death or of the appointment of the administrator in sufficient time to pre-
sent his claim within the- prescribed time.
The non-claim statute, Ohio General Code Section 10509-112, was held
'89 Ohio App. 471, 103 N.E.2d 37 (1951).
'90 Ohio App. 195, 105 N.E.2d 429 (1950).
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applicable to a novel fact situation in Baydden v. Mitchell.8  The vendor,
alleging the deceased purchaser's default, brought an action against the ad-
ministratrix of the purchaser's estate, seeking rescission of a land contract and
also the right to retain all payments made by the purchaser as liquidated
damages in accordance with the terms of the contract.
While not necessary to the decision, since the purchaser was found not
in default, the court, nevertheless, held that the vendor could not rescind
without restoring the purchaser's consideration except by relying on thi
terms of the contract permitting the vendor to keep all payments, and that
such reliance brought the vendor within Section 10509-112 which requires
presentation of the claim to the administratrix, an act which the vendor
had not performed.
Construction of Will
That the wills drafstman should always tickle his mental file to make
certain that he has not ran afoul of the doctrine of elusdem generis is
illustrated in Snodgrass v. Sotodgrass7 where it was held that a bequest of
"all of my personal property and personal effects, such as furniture, house-
hold goods and jewelry," under the doctrine of elasdem genensr, limited the
property passing thereunder to such items as were particularly enumerated,
and other items of personal property not included therein (such as the
testator's automobile, stock, checking account and proceeds of insurance
policies) passed under the residuary clause of the will.
Execution of Wills
Two interesting cases involving the execution of wills were reported in
1952. In Borgman v. Dillow' both witnesses testified that although they
were asked to witness the testatrux's will, the testatrix did not sign the will
in their presence, they were not told by her that she had signed it, and they
could not see whether the testatri's signature was on the instrument when
they signed it since only the attestation clause was visible to them. The
probate court refused to probate the instrument. The court of appeals in
affirming the decision stated that in the absence of proof tending to show
that the testatrix had signed the instrument prior to the witnesses' subscrip-
ion the instrument was not entitled to probate.
While the result reached by the court seems correct the writer submits
that even had the testatrix's signature been on the instrument at the time
the witnesses signed it still should not have been entitled to probate, for
while Ohio General Code Section 10504-3 permits a testator to acknowledge
his signature to attesting witnesses, how can one acknowledge that a signa-
ture is his if such signature is not visible? 9
'102 N.E.2d 21 (Ohio App. 1951).
'90 Ohio App. 441, 107 N.E.2d 155 (1951).
[sprng8
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The second execution case is Roosa v. Wickward.10 In that case one of
the attesting witnesses was dead at the time the will was offered for probate.
The surviving witness testified that the testatrix informed her that a paper
lying on a table was the testatri's will and asked her to sign the will, but the
.testatrix did not sign the will in her presence, and she was, as a result of the
way in which the instrument was folded, unable to see, and did not know,
whether the testatrx's signature was on the instrument.
The surviving witness further testified that she and the deceased witness
did not sign in the presence of each other but that the deceased witness' sig-
nature was on the instrument when the surviving witness signed. The pro-
bate court refused to admit the instrument to probate on the ground that
the purported will was not executed according to law. In reversing, the
court of appeals stated: "A presumption of due execution of a will arises
from the fact of attestation, reciting an observance of all statutory require-
ments, in the absence of a contest as to the genuineness of the signature of
testator and witnesses," and that proponents sustained the burden of making
a prima facie case in favor of the validity of the will.
The case, both prima facie and upon close scrutiny, appears incorrectly
decided.1 While it is true that in the absence of proof to the contrary a
presumption of due execution arises from the fact of attestation, where there
is only such contrary evidence the presumption of due execution does not
arise, or if it does it is rebutted, for the due execution of a will cannot be
assumed in the face of only positive evidence to the contrary merely be-
cause it purports to be the will of the testator and the attestation is in due
form.' 2
Inheritance Rights of An Adopted Child
Always interesting, generally confusing and never quite settled are the
inheritance rights of an adopted child. Thrd Nationa Bank & Ttust Co.
" 105 N.E2d 69 (Ohio App. 1951).
"Attention is called to the case of Keyl v. Feuchter, 56 Ohio St. 424, 47 N.E. 140
(1897), where an interpretation of a partly analogous execution statute was made
in a somewhat similar fact situation. The extent to which the case is applicable
to the problem of the visibility of the testator's signature seems to be one on which
reasonable minds may well differ, since the issue of publication of the will as well
as acknowledgment of the testator's signature was involved. See Note, 4 WEST. Rns.
L Ruv. 158 (1952).
" 90 Ohio App. 213, 105 N.B2d 454 (1950).
nThe court failed to mention Keyl v. Feuchter, 56 Ohio St. 424, 47 N.E. 140
(1897), where in a similar fact situation the supreme court upheld a refusal to admit
the instrument to probate. Although, in the Keyl case the court did not discuss
the prima facie issue, since the proponents at that time, as now, were required only
to prove a prima facie case to entitle the will to probate, it is assumed that the court
was aware of the burden and felt that such burden had not been sustained.
'For a statement to this effect, see Haynes v. Haynes, 33 Ohio St. 598 (1878).
19531
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
v. Davidsoi 1'3 involved an action to determine whether a grandchild adopted
after the death of the testatrix was a beneficiary of a testamentary trust
established by the testatrix in a codicil to her will, wherein she bequeathed
property to" each of my then living grandchildren, whether born prior
or subsequent to my decease. " At the time of the execution of the
codicil and at her death testatrix had four grandchildren, all of whom were
blood children of her daughter. Both the probate court and the court of
appeals decided in favor of the adopted child. In reversing and remanding
the judgment the supreme court stated: "In view of the facts that in be-
queathing or devising property by will it is presumed that a testator who has
not been a party to any adoption proceedings prefers his own blood relatives
to strangers; that at the times of the execution of the tenth codicil and of
testatrix's decease neither of her children had adopted any children; that in
such codicil she made her grandchildren direct beneficiaries and not bene-
ficiaries through her children; and that she provided for her grandchildren
born before or after her decease, as distinguished from adopted, we have
come to the conclusion that she intended her grandchildren named in the
tenth codicil to be those who were born to her children and not those
adopted by them."'"
The adopted child prevailed, however, in Tiedtke v. Tiedtke.'5 The
testator, after leaving a life estate to his daughter, provided that: "In case
of the death of my daughter leaving no children, then such trust
estate shall be divided mong my heirs at law." The testator's daughter was
unmarried at the tune of the testator's death in 1924. She married later
but died leaving only an adopted child surviving her. Both the probate
court and the court of appeals held in favor of the adopted child. The
supreme court in affirming the judgment stated: "Where in providing for
his 'heirs at law' after a life interest, a testator indicates his intention that
such heirs should be determined at the date of the expiration of such life
interest, then the statutory law in effect at the expiration of such life inter-
est should be applied in determining such heirs of the testator unless by the
provisions of the will or surrounding circumstances a contrary intention
is indicated, even though such statutory law will permit an adopted child
of the testator's daughter to take and the statutory law in effect at the
U157 Ohio St. 355, 105 N.E.2d 573 (1952).
"Id. at 366-367, 105 N.E.2d at 579.
"157 Ohio St. 554, 106 N.E.2d 637 (1952).
"Ibtd. Syllabus 2.
"108 N.E.2d 88 (Miami Com. P1.), all'd, 108 N.E.2d 101 (Ohio App. 1952).
OHio GEN. CODE § 10504-73.
158 Ohio St. 54, 107 N.E.2d 120 (1952).
Id. at 66, 107 N.E.2d at 126.
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testator's death would not have permitted such adopted child to take and
even though such adopted child was not either born or adopted until long
after the testator's death."'
Contract to Devise Property
In re Barnes' Estate7 involved a rather complicated fact situation where-
by a husband and wife, intervivos, made an equal division of their property
among themselves and orally agreed to make mutual wills and to do what-
ever else was necessary to assure that the first decedent's property would
pass to the survivor with full power to consume and at the survivor's death
the unconsumed estate would pass to the decedentes brothers and sisters.
Mutual wills to this effect were made. The parties, however, had acquired
title to certain realty by a joint and survivorship deed so that when the
husband died the surviving wife took itle to the realty as a result of the
deed and not the husband's will, the effect of which was to remove the
realty from the control of the husband's will in regard to the matter of un-
consumed property. As a result their scheme of equal division, in so far as
the realty was concerned, was frustrated when the surviving wife died
possessed of such realty for by her will it passed not to the husband's heirs,
as both had by their oral agreement intended, but to the wife's heirs. Excep-
tions to the inventory of the wife's estate were filed by the husband's heirs.
The common pleas court held that the part performance of the oral contract
on the part of the husband removed it from the ban of the Statute of Frauds
and that a trust would be impressed upon the property in accordance with
the agreement of the husband and wife.
Effect of Lapse of Residuary Bequest or Devise
The question of to whom property passes upon the lapse or ineffective-
ness of a residuary bequest in a situation where the residuary legatees are not
members of a class, and to which the "anti-lapse" statutes8 is not applicable,
was presented to the supreme court for the first time in Commerce Natwn4
Bank of Toledo v. Browmng. O While the great bulk of numerical au-
thority holds that the lapse& portion passes as intestate property on the
theory that there can be no residue of a residue, the court in the Commerce
case cast their lot with the minority, stating that: " if a bequest or de-
vise of a part of the residue lapses or is otherwise ineffective, that part of
the residue, except as provided by statute and in the absence of provisions
of the will or surrounding circumstances justifying the condusion that the
testator expressed a different intention, will ordinarily pass under such
residuary provisions of the will to any other parties entitled thereunder to
portions of the residue, instead of passing as intestate property."20 The
position taken by the court seems desirable since it probably corresponds in
the majority of instances to the wishes of the testator.
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